Greetings from the Chair

It is an honor to introduce myself to you as the Chair of the Department of Philosophy at KU. This is my second year at KU and I am very grateful to my colleagues and students for their warm welcome and generous support. We have a great deal of news to share, so this is a somewhat heftier issue of our newsletter than usual. Our department is a growing, busy and increasingly cosmopolitan place. Over 3,300 students enrolled in philosophy courses last year alone. Scholarship by our faculty is highly regarded and widely cited, we have a healthy number of undergraduate majors and our graduate programs continue to attract students from all over the world.

Philosophy has deep roots at The University of Kansas and Professor Richard De George is a central figure in that history. Richard is a distinguished philosopher, cherished teacher and among his many achievements, he is widely acknowledged as the founder of the field of business ethics. With his retirement in 2012, after 53 years of service, Richard holds the record as the longest serving faculty member at KU. Retirement has not slowed Richard down. He continues to publish and conduct research at his usual impressive pace and is a prominent participant in the intellectual life of the Department. While Richard misses teaching, he now has more time in his schedule to accept numerous invitations that he receives to speak at conferences and meetings around the world. In this issue, you can read more about Richard’s recent work and about an annual lecture on ethics and society that we have established in his honor.

Professor Ann Cudd was recently awarded a University Distinguished Professorship for her work to integrate social science research with timeless ethical and political questions. Her inaugural lecture “Justice and Freedom: A Cooperative Venture for Mutual Advantage” was a highlight of the academic year. Ann’s lecture allowed us a chance to discuss her important contributions to philosophy. We have included the text of her lecture here.

Not all of our news is happy. We mourned the loss of Professor Richard Cole, who died in April after a lengthy illness. Professor Cole retired in 2001 after 36 years of service to KU. He is remembered with great affection by his students and colleagues.

It is likely that you took an interest in philosophy because a great teacher, like Richard, introduced you to fundamental questions or rich new ways thinking. Since the last edition of our newsletter four new colleagues have joined the KU Philosophy department. Eileen Nutting, Sarah Robins, Armin Schulz, and I are all committed to continuing the tradition of excellence in teaching and scholarship that has marked the KU Philosophy department throughout its history.

There is ample evidence that our discipline is not just an intrinsically worthwhile activity, but that it provides the cognitive skills necessary for responsible twenty-first century citizenship. As a friend of the department or as a former philosophy student, you recognize the importance of genuinely critical and creative thinkers for our collective well-being. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your support to advance the department with your philanthropy. With your gifts, we enrich the lives of future Jayhawks in so many ways: we attract renowned teachers and scholars, we enhance scholarships that support the best and brightest young minds, we spur innovative discussion and offer solutions to the world’s most pressing needs through research, and bring new ideas to KU with excellent visiting speakers. As state funding for higher education in Kansas declines, your support has allowed us to maintain a world-class philosophy department at KU. Your philanthropy allows the department to enhance the educational experience of our students, and we deeply appreciate your consideration and your assistance.

We are eager to strengthen and build our network of alumni around the world, and are always interested to connect with you—if you are in Lawrence please come and visit us or drop us a note anytime. Thank you for partnering with us to realize our vision, as we make our great department even better. —John Symons
CURRENT STUDENTS

A paper by Christopher Stratman (Senior) was included in The University of Kansas Journal of Undergraduate Research (Fall 2012-Spring 2013). The title of the paper is “Plato’s Psychological Manifestations of Madness: A Case for a Parallel between Philosophical and Tyrannical Souls in The Republic.”

Andrew McFarland was awarded a Chateaubriand Fellowship to complete his dissertation. He will study in Paris for the 2013-2014 academic year.

Michael Hayes presented a paper at the Syracuse University Graduate Student Conference during spring 2013. The paper, “Hedonism, Possible Worlds, and Death,” was a critique of theories of well-being which require comparisons between possible worlds to determine the goodness of one’s life.

Arizona State University was the setting for a paper that Kurt Blankschaen presented in 2013. The title of that paper was “Subaltern Generics.” This fall he will be traveling to London to present “Breaking Through Absurd Walls” to The Albert Camus Society.

In Spring 2013, Ashley Acosta-Fox presented “Moral- ity at the Market[place]: Conscientious Consumerism and Ethical Products” at two conferences: in February, at the Midsouth Philosophy Conference in Memphis, TN, and in April, at the Seventh Annual Felician Ethics Conference in Rutherford, NJ. Ashley was awarded a Philosophy Department Templin Fellowship and a Doctoral Research Grant from Research and Graduate Studies for Summer 2013. She used the Doctoral Research Grant to conduct archival research for her dissertation at Stanford University.

During Spring 2012, Deborah Williams participated in a panel presentation on the “Field Study Observations of China’s New Frontier: Reconciling the Goals of Economic Development and Environmental Protection,” Asian Studies Development Program (ASDP) 18th Annual National Conference, Seattle, WA. She is a participant in panel presentations at the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions (NCSCBHEP) Conference in New York City. During the fall, she also attended the International Association of Environmental Philosophy Conference in Philadelphia, PA. Deborah continues as the President of the Faculty Association at Johnson County Community College and was the Lead Negotiator for faculty in negotiating their employment contract with the Board of Trustees at JCCC.

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On October 5, 2013, Sean Meseroll presented “Hedonism about Happiness” at the 2013 Northwest Philosophy Conference held at the Pacific University in Forest Grove, Oregon. He also presented another paper called “Pessimism and Optimism in the Latter Nietzsche” at the 2011 Indiana Philosophical Association Conference at Ball State University.

Let us know what you are doing, send updates to chodges@ku.edu.

HOW TO SUPPORT THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

We depend on you to attest to the value of an education in philosophy, and our students and faculty soar to new heights because of you. With your gifts, we enrich the lives of future Jayhawks in so many ways: attract renowned teachers and scholars, enhance scholarships that support the best and brightest young minds around the country, spur innovative discussion and solutions to our world’s most pressing needs through research grants and awards, and bring new ideas to KU through visiting lectures and experts.

Now, more than ever, your philanthropy for KU allows the department to enhance the educational experience of our students, and we always appreciate your consideration.

To donate to the Philosophy Department online, you can find information on the various options for giving at www.kuendowment.org/philosophy.

You may also send a contribution by mail to:

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Be sure to specify the gift is for the Philosophy Department.

Thank you for partnering with us to realize our vision, as we make our great university even better.

Congratulations to Christopher Caldwell, PhD, 2004 for receiving tenure at Virginia State University. Chris is an Associate Professor doing work in ethics and applied ethics.
1. Philosophical thinking about human life

Philosophers are enthusiastic about big questions that people have thought about for a long time, at least four thousand years, and probably as long as humans could formulate thoughts. These are questions that children are also often good at formulating: why is there something rather than nothing? What, if anything, can give meaning to life? What makes human lives go well or badly? Why should I not hit my brother? Being a philosopher is a lot of fun because we get to think about these simple-minded, hard questions and still get paid for doing so. Philosophers are also fortunate in being able to take up many such big questions over the course of a career without being counted mere dilettantes. We are, after all, professional gadflies. I have taken advantage of this by dabbling in problems in many different areas of philosophy. All philosophical problems have a fundamentally normative question at their core, that is, a question about how things ought to be, about what is good, right, true, or beautiful: how ought we reason? is knowledge possible? How ought we live? What is artful?

2. Game theory and rationality

In graduate school I was especially interested in questions about rationality and action: what does or should a rational individual do when interacting with other rational individuals? What are the characteristics of strategic rationality, and how can understanding the requirements of rationality help to interpret and predict what human beings will do in social interactions? This is the question for which game theory, a mathematical approach to modeling strategic interaction, was invented. I was very fortunate to be at the University of Pittsburgh when the philosophy of economics was just being recognized as a field of research, its first journal was founded at Carnegie Mellon, and there were professors in Philosophy and in Economics (especially David Gauthier and Alvin Roth) at both schools with whom I could study game theory. Following questions where they led, however, brought me to a conclusion that I have been trying to make sense of ever since: game theory’s hallmark result, the Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games, exists only for rational individuals under impossibly unrealistic knowledge conditions. Namely, they have to not only know the precise conditions of their interactive situation but also know that they each know and know that they know that they each know, and so forth for all possible infinite levels of mutual knowledge. This is a condition called “common knowledge.” Lacking any one of these levels of mutual knowledge, I discovered, leaves us with the impossibility of deductively inferring an equilibrium solution for the general case.

Let me give you a little puzzle that illustrates the type of problem I was interested in, called the red hat game puzzle.

Suppose you have a hundred people sitting around a long table in a room, each with a red hat on, they can see each other’s hats, but not their own. A red hat game official comes in and says “I will ring this bell and when you know you have a red hat on, you may leave the room.” He rings it once and no one leaves. Rings it again; no one leaves. He rings it infinitely many times; no one leaves. Now he says “there is at least one red hat in the room,” and gives the same instructions as before. He rings it once; no one leaves. He rings it again; no one leaves. He repeats this and on the 100th bell, everyone leaves.

How did they know they had red hats on? What difference did the statement that there was at least one red hat in the room make? After all, everyone already knew that there was at least one red hat in the room; they could each see 99 of them. To see how the puzzle works, consider the two person case. Here we have two guys looking at each other’s hats; when the bell rings they cannot deduce from no information that they have a red hat on their own head. But now they know that there is at least one red hat
in the room, and that the other knows that. Then after one bell they think to themselves “hey, he didn’t leave, so that means he must see that I have a red hat on,” and on the second bell they both leave. So the information that they got from the announcement that there is at least one red hat in the room is “I know that he knows that there is at least one red hat in the room,” that is, the second level of mutual knowledge that there is at least one red hat in the room is what they needed to deduce that they had a red hat on after the other guy stayed when the bell was rung. The statement actually gave them full common knowledge that there is at least one red hat in the room, that is, all the nested levels of mutual knowledge: I know that he knows, I know that he knows that I know, I know that he knows that I know that he knows, and so forth. I leave the 3 person case for you as an exercise to show that what is needed is the third level of mutual knowledge that there is at least one red hat in the room, and the 100 person case, which requires 100 levels of mutual knowledge, you will have to believe “by induction,” I assure you.

What this puzzle illustrates is that not only knowledge but mutual knowledge is important for reasoning about action. If mutual knowledge of one key aspect of the situation is missing even perfect reasoners – reasoners who can go through that entire 100 levels of he knows that she knows that he knows... reasoning – cannot solve the puzzle. Ok, 100 levels of mutual knowledge is a heroic assumption, but 2 levels is not and so the higher levels might just be considered a simplifying assumption that is approximated in reality by real human beings, who, after all, don’t play many 100 person red hat games. But this puzzle does not show the worst problem for game theory, which startled me when I found it. I had set out to prove that finite levels of mutual knowledge would be enough for perfect reasoners to reason their way generally to solutions to games. But, alas, in my dissertation I proved that to be false: the full set of infinite levels of common knowledge is necessary in the general case.

Since proving this result, game theory has held little attraction for me as a theory of human rationality. That is not to say it is useless, however. I now use it to interpret and understand how social institutions motivate people to behave in certain patterned ways and I have come to use it as this kind of interpretive device, but only one tool among many for understanding how people should or do behave. So game theory in itself became a lot less compelling for me, and other philosophical questions became more interesting.

3. Feminist political philosophy

Shortly after coming to KU as an assistant professor I read a book in feminist political philosophy that rocked my world: Susan Moller Okin’s *Justice, Gender, and the Family*. This book is an investigation of the male-dominated history of political philosophy through a liberal feminist lens. She asks: how does our theory of justice change when you take seriously the actual lives of human beings, who live in families and half of whom are women and girls, whose lives do not resemble the public lives of the men who populate the great political theories of Aristotle, Locke, Kant, and Rawls? What happens when you look at intimate family life as a bargain among rational individuals whose gender determines their opportunities outside the family, and hence their bargaining power within? This book and several other works by feminists working in economics, political science, and philosophy, changed the focus of my research from foundational questions in which I applied epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science to understand and critique economic models to philosophical questions about justice, freedom and oppression, in which my training in economics could be used to understand patterns of human social interaction.

My research in social and political philosophy begins from a fundamental commitment to the value of the individual as the moral and political starting point, that is, liberalism. So I ask the simple-minded, hard, normative question: What makes individual human life go well or badly? Here are some answers that raise the questions that motivate my research:

- Freedom. But what is freedom? And should we really want it?
- The opportunity to develop our capacity for morality, cooperative interaction, excellence in a diversity of valuable activities pursued cooperatively in competition with each other. How do we best achieve this? What are the social and political obstacles to achieving this?
- Dignity and freedom from violence and coercion: what is coercion?
- Justice: what is justice? How is justice related to freedom and coercion?

4. Methodology

Before I sketch out my answers to some of these questions, I need to set the stage with just a bit. My work in philosophy of economics and philosophy of social science, and most importantly, my work in feminist philosophy, led me to some methodological maxims, if you will. Armchair philosophy is inadequate to recognize many of the real problems of human beings, because it focuses insularly on what other philosophers have thought, and those philosophers have come from a narrow spectrum of human experience. Philosophy generalizes and universalizes, and this is a good method for some things, but misses the exceptions that can prove new rules. First, as feminist theorists like to say, lived experience is important. Social theory built upon no actual stories and evidence of human experience is blind. This requires me to use lots of examples from actual human experiences. Second, descriptive analysis – data – and scientific explanation is important. Third, the real test of a theory of a normative
concept is whether it can improve our ability to change or manipulate the phenomena. In other words, a theory about freedom that doesn’t help you see how to achieve freedom is not a good theory. So with these methodological notes, let me tell you a bit of what I discovered through my research on justice and freedom.

5. Oppression

One of the main topics of my research has been social oppression. Oppression has been one of the central concepts of feminist philosophy, as well as philosophy of race. As I see it, oppression is the major obstacle to justice and freedom and therefore should be understood as a central concept in moral, social, and political philosophy, but it has been strangely neglected. My book *Analyzing Oppression* aimed to put oppression in its place by explaining how it prevents us from living well and why it is so hard to overcome. I characterize oppression as having four defining features. The first is harm – for someone to be oppressed they must be harmed, which means that their interests are somehow compromised. This could be a physical injury or psychological hurt, or it may not be a harm that is felt by the victim; it may be an imposed inequality or unfairness that they may or may not recognize. The second feature is that the harm comes as a result of belonging to a social group. This is what makes oppression a fundamentally social injustice. Many oppressed social groups are what I call non-voluntary social groups, also called ascriptive groups that one is ascribed to by others in society, such as race, gender, or ethnicity. Persons can also be oppressed as members of a religion that they voluntarily join or because they refuse to join one. Oppression is a violation of freedom of association in those voluntary cases. The third defining feature of oppression is that there is a social group that is privileged with respect to the harms suffered by the oppressed group. This is in part what makes oppression an injustice – others gain through the group’s oppression. One of the insidious things about oppression is that members of a social group can be privileged involuntarily, and perhaps even be just as powerless to change oppressive social institutions that privilege them as those in the oppressed group. Fourth, the harm is coercive or unjust. This prevents people from claiming they are oppressed when they are in fact suffering a well-deserved harm, such as guilty criminals who are forced to make restitution or serve time in a decent prison.

Notice that by my definition, some people, perhaps even most people, are oppressed as members of some social group yet privileged as members of others. The middle class White American woman is oppressed with respect to gender, yet privileged with respect to class, race, and national origin. I take it that this reflects a real feature of our complex social lives. The definition alone says nothing about which of these features defines a person’s identity, determines how she as an individual will be treated, or how she will perceive or feel about her status with respect to oppression or privilege.

My next task was to explain how oppression gets started and then keeps going. I think oppression is puzzling in light of a few basic facts about humanity. I take it that we are roughly equal in the sense that the philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote about and based his social contract on in the 17th century. That is, we are equal in the sense that in spite of differences among us with respect to cognitive, imaginative, or physical abilities, we could, if we were really motivated, kill each other. No one is invulnerable; we all pose a threat to each other. Thus, if we treat each other badly enough, then we give each other a motive to fight back, and to put each other in constant danger and fear of violent death. And down that road, Hobbes explained, lies the war of all against all, in which the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Thus it seems puzzling to me why any group of people would try to subjugate another, or why any group would suffer without such violent retaliation that it would soon be seen as a bad idea to try to subjugate them. How, in practice, are some groups able to oppress others?

The explanatory theory I give of oppression is a “social force analysis”, which involves what I call forces of oppression. There are two material forces at work: systematic violence, which includes forceful injuries and threats to injure people and things they care about, and economic forces, which include discrimination, segregation, slavery, harassment, and opportunity inequality. Then there are psychological forces of oppression, which can be cognitive, that is having to do with how beliefs are formed, such as stereotyping, ideology, and false consciousness, or affective, that is having to do with feelings and emotions, such as terror, humiliation, degradation, and deformed desires. While some of the forces are direct, that is, applied by others or by the social norms and institutions that have been erected by past individual actions; others are indirect, meaning that they work through the oppressed person’s own psychology or choices and behaviors to reinforce oppression. To summarize my analysis in a sentence: oppression is an unjust, social group-based harm that is perpetrated through social institutions by means of direct and indirect material and psychological forces, privileging other social groups.

There are many puzzling things about oppression, but most puzzling of all, and what my research aims primarily to explain is what I call the endurance question: why does some oppression last for generations despite the fact of rough natural equality of humans that I mentioned earlier? My answer is that oppression endures because the oppressed are co-opted, through a variety of psychological, economic, and violent means, to join in the oppression of their own social group. They are co-opted to internalize.


oppressive emotions such as feelings of inferiority, shame, terror, and trauma, and they are also co-opted into acting in ways that reinforce and continue oppression for their social group. The oppressed tend to fulfill stereotypes about them, they typically accept the best of a bad set of options, and then embrace that option as if it were a good one, all things considered. They join in the criticism of members of their own group who resist oppression and thereby police the boundaries of their social group. They play their allotted roles in the economy and help to stabilize and reinforce oppressive norms.

Why do they (or rather we) do this? Fundamentally, it is because it is in each person’s individual interest to make the best of the options presented, and only collective action, which we cannot count on others to join, or very rare individual actions can transcend the options presented to members of oppressed groups. What I mean by this is that we come into a world of social norms, expectations, stereotypes, and traditions that are already there and set by an endless number of interactions and behaviors of those who come before us. As individuals we are almost completely powerless to change them. In the marketplace of social norms, we are norm-takers, not norm-setters. Yes, there can be exceptions to this, when a charismatic and imaginative individual inspires a large group of people to resist and ultimately change the norms. But most of us most of the time cannot count on others to join us and so we must do the best we can for ourselves within the norms and rules our cultures present to us. Resisting alone is a very risky strategy. Most of us recognize the risks and accept the oppressive norms and conform to them in order to get the maximum reward available from the social system. We live up to the stereotypes so that we are not seen as deviant. But for the oppressed, whose stereotypes are demeaning, this in turn causes feelings of inferiority and shame, and it prevents the oppressed from competing on a level field with the privileged. Thus, while direct forces are necessary to get oppression going for a social group, it is the indirect forces of oppression that I believe are the most insidious and the answer to the endurance question.

I am an optimist nonetheless, and so in my work I try to look forward to ways that we can work to overcome oppression. I distinguish the situation of the end of one or more cases of oppression, but where new forms of oppression develop, from full freedom, where we have learned to, quoting Nelson Mandela, “live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.” In various works I have tried to argue that freedom for all is a good for each. In my book, I concentrated on one type of argument for this claim, which is that a world of free persons who participate fully in shared activities is a better world for each of us than one in which some groups of persons are prevented from this sort of full, free, and cooperative expression. I relied here on a concept elaborated by the great political philosopher John Rawls, called the social union. A social union is a group of persons collaborating in a shared activity that brings out the best in each and results in that sort of shared product that lifts up all of them. In a society with many social unions we come to see that by expanding our circle of concern to others who were once excluded we can increase our pleasure by increasing our opportunities to collaborate and achieve.

This idea of finding pleasure in each other’s achievements and coming to identify with them is, I think, key to solving many social problems and understanding what justice and morality requires. I argue that this is characteristic of the society of free persons, which is not only free of current oppressions, but whose members seek to free all persons of oppression. For in such a society the individuals are able to seek their own good while valuing others’ attempts to do the same. They seek to encourage diversity and enhance the freedom of others. They take pleasure in and identify with the accomplishments of others. And further, they come to see their own freedom as connected to that of the others.

6. Capitalism

Oppression is not the only obstacle to freedom and justice. Another major obstacle is material deprivation or poverty. In several articles and a recent book I argue that, with the right kinds of property rights and regulations, capitalism can be the solution to the problem of deprivation as well as a means of achieving other important freedoms. Furthermore, I argue that capitalism is especially good for the world’s women. Adhering to my methodological maxims to begin from actual lives, use data and scientific theory, and work toward transformative theory, I assembled both historical and current data to make the case that capitalism has caused huge, positive changes in human lives. Namely, the capitalism-fueled development of industry and society has changed life expectancy around the world from just over 30 years at the turn of the 19th century to over 60 in nearly every country, and over 70 in many countries. And of most importance for women, this development has dropped the fertility rate from over seven per woman to around two per woman. Those are just to mention the two most important data points of all, and not the countless ways that daily life has been made easier, safer, and more pleasant for nearly every living human being than it was before the dawn of capitalism.

Now of course, that is not the end of the story, nor is it to say that every human individual leads a life free of deprivation, let alone that things cannot be made better. My work on capitalism seeks to describe an enlightened economic system, and to defend it against three types of opponents. First there are the libertarians who believe

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that we can have a free market with very minimal laws and virtually no taxes. I think that the legal framework defining property rights has to be extensive to ensure the good features of capitalism, those that make it justifiable to defend with coercive force. Second there are the socialists who hold that the right to own capital is an unimportant freedom and leads to oppressive inequalities. I think that the economic freedoms including the right to own a business are crucial for developing one’s capacities and protecting against tyranny, in addition to being the best way to avoid poverty. Third there are the feminists who argue that capitalism devalues women’s labor. I argue that capitalism helps to eliminate the concept of women’s labor. Each of these opponents has important points that I consider in imagining a more enlightened form of capitalism.

So what is this enlightened form of capitalism? First let’s consider the basic defining conditions of capitalism. By “capitalism” Marx meant an economic system whose core, defining feature is private ownership of the means of production, that is, of capital inputs to production. This is the private ownership of capital condition. In capitalism people are free to choose their occupations, as long as they can find someone who wants to employ them or they have the capital to start a business where they can employ themselves. This is the free wage labor condition. Both of these conditions imply that governments do not control centrally what is made or consumed, but rather that is determined by the uncoordinated private decisions of individuals who are free to contract to buy or sell their labor, capital, goods, and services with each other with relative freedom from constraint by government. Let us call this the decentralized open market condition.

The big problems with capitalism in the actual world are that it exacerbates inequality and provides opportunities to continue longstanding patterns of discrimination and segregation. The reasons in favor of capitalism are very strong, however, because it inspires us to create, innovate, and produce things that people want. It allows us to freely choose how we will work and for whom, and liberates women especially from the ties of kin and tradition. It gives us reason to cooperate with strangers around the world if only to trade with them for our mutual advantage. I maintain that we also find reasons internal to the logic of capitalism itself for mitigating inequality and discrimination.

In my view, and this is contrary to what most libertarians hold, property rights are not natural rights but rather conventional. They are defined within a community and have no existence outside that community. How should we design property rights, then? I argue that we should see society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, and that rules of justice, including property rights should be designed to achieve mutual advantage. What I mean by mutual advantage is that each person is made better off under the agreed upon institutional structure than they would be if they could not come to agreement. With mutual advantage as the standard for making agreements, each benefits. Now it may well be the case that there are many different institutional structures which could generate agreement and cooperation as well as mutual benefit. I argue that all of these involve some type of capitalist property rights structures. Furthermore, all of the mutually beneficial arrangements that achieve cooperative agreement by all will also rule out gross inequalities under which people live undignified lives. This is so because no one will put up with indignity, or at least they will not do so without always looking for a way to cheat, steal, or get revenge on those who they see as unfairly benefitting from the system. (Recall the Hobbesian war of all against all.) Finally, I argue that invidious discrimination will also be ruled out in such a system, since discrimination is not only economically inefficient, and so not as mutually beneficial as not discriminating, but also it is another way of treating people in undignified ways that will not achieve peaceful, trusting cooperation.

The enlightened ideal of capitalism I defend, then, is a system in which there are non-discriminatory, legal protections of decentralized, private ownership of resources, cooperative, social production for all citizens, and free and open competitive markets for exchange of goods, labor, services, and material and financial capital. This definition implies the socially and governmentally sanctioned nature of the system. Laissez-faire capitalism is an unrealizable ideal that could never exist in fact because for capitalism to even exist, let alone prosper, property rights need definition by a legislative body and protection by a police force. If people do not have secure rights to things, they need not trade, since they can just take, and when they have something, it can be just as easily taken away. Markets require trust and security, such as can only be supplied by a complex social system of rights, trust, and protection. Social, cooperative interaction is thus at the heart of the system, in both the creation of the social, legal infrastructure that frames economic production and exchange, and in production and exchange in themselves. This definition emphasizes the competitive character of the system, which has both positive and negative implications for human well-being. Capitalism is a form of cooperative competition, a set of socially accepted rules, a game, if you will, within which players seek their best advantage. Its normative value as a social system depends upon both the rules that delimit the game and the values by which its players define their best advantage. Pursued in its enlightened form, capitalism enhances freedom and dignity for all, and allows each to pursue their own chosen way of life.

7. Contractarianism

My current project is to develop a political theory that endorses enlightened capitalism, while recognizing

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and mitigating oppression and enhancing freedom. This theory is contractarianism, which is related to the moral theory of the same name that is identified with my dissertation advisor, David Gauthier. Although I didn’t work on contractarianism when I was his student (recall I was working on the foundations of game theory), I have come to see it as the moral theory that best fits with my political philosophy and my metaethical commitments. Metaethics is the study of the basic underlying assumptions of our moral thought and practice. One of the basic metaethical questions is whether morality is all relative, or whether moral facts reflect reality. That has always seemed to me to be a false dichotomy. Contractarian ethics holds that moral rules are the outcome of agreement among rational individuals. Thus the metaethical view of contractarianism is neither relativist nor realist but rather conventional. And that seems right to me for lots reasons, such as the fact that we do not have to assume that there is some source of morality that is external to humanity, such as a god or some self-evident truth.

Political contractarianism holds that legitimate political authority of government derives from the consent of the governed, where the form and content of this consent derives from the idea of contract or mutual agreement. Contractarian theory is criticized as being unable ultimately to show that morality or cooperative social behavior can be inspired by appeal to mere rationality without some additional moral foundations. I am trying to show that enlightened capitalism, which is non-oppressive and freedom-enhancing, can be derived from this political theory, without any further moral assumptions. Although the capitalism part of that derivation doesn’t strike philosophers as very surprising, the enlightened part does.

8. Summary

So to sum up, my work seeks to show that justice and freedom can be achieved when persons come together to seek their mutual advantage. Deriving this result from no prior moral assumptions other than the primacy of the human individual, my work answers the skeptic about morality and justice who asks “why should I follow the rules?” In my view, we can be motivated to follow these agreed upon rules not only through rationality, but also through seeing each other as fellow players in the game of life, in which we must cooperate and follow the rules in order for competition to bring out the best in each of us. My work is normative analysis that is grounded in social science, both theoretical and descriptive, and in the observations and theorizing that excluded groups such as women and racial minorities have brought to academic notice. Although my work is primarily academic, I seek to enable and enhance the work of those who are on the front lines of changing lives, in domestic violence shelters, in legislative bodies, and in international organizations that work with women and refugees. I hope to enable us to see the world as capable of change, and to see freedom and justice as a cooperative venture that we can achieve for each only when we achieve it for all.

A university is a primary example of such a cooperative venture. Through our study together, teachers and students cooperate to raise questions, study and debate potential answers, and solve problems. It is at once a cooperative and a competitive enterprise that lifts up all of us. My best ideas and arguments have come to me in dialogue with my teachers and my students. In addition to the many persons who I had the opportunity to thank at the beginning of my talk, I am grateful to the students I have engaged in this cooperative venture with over the years. So I will end my talk with this slide showing some of them.

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2012 Undergraduate Awards

Amid fire alarms and evacuations, we had our annual honor’s banquet in the Jayhawk Room at the Kansas Union. The following awards were given out:

**Lindsay Grantham** and **Michael Raven** each received a Brownstein-Young Award.

**Ojas Patel** and **Andrew Wagner** were each awarded a Brownstein-Skidmore Award.

Warner Morse prizes went to **Megan Ritter** for ethics, **Cameron Bernard** for history of philosophy and **Joseph Seybold** for metaphysics and epistemology.

**Sinclaire Erdwien** received the Warner Morse Scholarship.

The **Brownstein-Young Award and Brownstein-Skidmore Award** are in honor of form faculty members J. Michael Young and Arthur Skidmore and are supported through the generosity of Don Brownstein. The **Warner Morse prizes and scholarship** are in honor of former faculty member Warner more.

**BA/BGS Degrees**

Miles Lane Anderson
Cameron Scott Bernard
Ian Patrick Boyle
Howard Robert Callihan
Michael Carl Hines
Lamar Hunt
Alex Andrew Klinghoffer
Brittany Jade Madrid
John Andrew Murray
Michelle Martina Nam
Megan K. Ritter
Thomas Gerard Schmeltz
Joseph Benton Seybold
Joshua Daniel Stilwell
Danon Elder Williamson

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2013 Undergraduate Awards

We held the annual honor’s banquet in the Malott Room at the Kansas Union on May 8, 2013. The following awards were given out:

**Evan Harmon** received a Brownstein-Young Award.

**Christopher Stratman** was awarded a Brownstein-Skidmore Award.

Warner Morse prizes went to **Michael Raven** for ethics, **Andrew Wagner** for history of philosophy and **Robert McKnight** for metaphysics and epistemology.

**Jeffrey Carmody** received the Warner Morse Scholarship.

**BA/BGS Degrees**

Kevin Bourbon
Chad Buck
Leonel Castro
Christopher Challans
Sinclaire Erdwien
William Franklin
Lindsay Grantham
J. T. Hammons
David Hardy
Jacob Lazzo
Robert McKnight
Jonathan Modisett
David Nelson
Ojas Patel
Cameron Pestinger
Ethan Poe
Jonathan Roby
Blake Romine
Mark Schmitz
Charles Tantillo
Andrew Wagner
Stoney Weaver
Jamie Webb
Zachary Williams
Cody Wood
**Graduate Awards**

During the spring honors banquets, several awards are given to deserving graduate students. Meredith Trexler (2012) and Andrew McFarland and Russell Waltz (2013) were given the Departmental GTA Award which recognizes excellence in teaching by a graduate student. Templin Fellowships went to Justin Clarke and Brandon Gillette in 2012 and Ashley Acosta-Fox, Jeremy DeLong, Sean Meseroll and Meredith Trexler in 2013. Ian McDaniel won the Robinson Essay Contest in 2013. Andrew McFarland (2012) and Micah Bailey (2013) were awarded the Anthony C. Genova scholarship. The Genova scholarship is award in memory of A. C. Genova and is given to a student who has performed exceptionally in the graduate program.

**M.A. Degrees**

Ian McDaniel (Spring 2012)  
Mbongisi Dyantyi (Summer 2012)  
Justin Clarke (Fall 2012)

**Ph.D. Degrees**


**Thank You**

We wish to thank and acknowledge those who have contributed to the Philosophy Department Endowment funds. These important resources allow the department to support graduate student travel, bring guest lecturers to broaden both faculty and student learning, and acknowledge outstanding students in the pursuit of their studies in philosophy.

Larry Blackman  
Donald Brownstein  
Albert Cinelli  
Lee and Margaret Crawford  
Richard De George  
Ben Eggleston  
John Fisher  
Garvey Kansas Foundation  
Beth Harshfield  
Betty Torrans Long  
Clancey Maloney  
Sean Meseroll  
Richard Newton  
Judy and George Paley  
Larry Poague  
Sue Oatman Roberts and William Roberts  
James and Lauren Swindler  
Christopher Tankersley  
William Tankersley  
James Woelfel  
Carolyn Bryan Young
A colleague in another department commented that he did not think Richard De George would ever retire. But he did on, on June 1, 2012, after serving on the faculty since 1959 for a total of 53 years. He set the record for the longest serving faculty member in the history of the University. (Until fairly recently KU had a mandatory retirement age of 70. To serve for 53 years one would have had to start when he or she was 17.) The International Center for Ethics in Business invited a special speaker to deliver the annual Lindy Lecture in his honor in March, and in April the Philosophy Department sponsored a special lecture and hosted a reception and a dinner to commemorate the occasion. The speaker was Thomas Donaldson, Mark O. Winkelman Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics and of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, who received his Ph.D. in philosophy from KU in 1976. The Society for Business Ethics, of which De George was a co-founder, held a special session at its annual meeting in August on his work; and the International Society for Business, Economics and Ethics gave him a framed etching of a town square in Warsaw, where it held its Fifth World Congress in July. De George presented two papers at the Congress: "A Semantic and Pragmatic Analysis of Responsibility and the Implications for CSR" and "Teaching Business Ethics as a Humanities Course." So far he has not found retirement much of a change, except for the absence of classes to teach—which he misses. He presented a paper, "Democracy as a Social Myth," at a meeting of the American Section of the International Society for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, in October and spoke on "Business Ethics in Today's Global Economy" at Davidson College in December and is presenting a paper at a conference in Chicago this October. He is working on a new book on business ethics.

A special Fund has been established in his name which will sponsor an annual lecture in the Department on the general theme of "Ethics and Society". Anyone interested in contributing to it during KU's current Fund Drive may send contributions to the DeGeorge Philosophy Fund, Kansas University Endowment Association, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045.
Professor John Bricke, in the second of three years of phased retirement, is teaching Phil 388: Analytic Philosophy Frege-Quine and his last Davidson seminar. He continues work on a projected book manuscript on Davidson, Interpretation and Evaluation. A paper, ‘Hume and Davidson: Passion, Evaluation, and Truth’, originally presented at a conference on Hume and Modern Philosophy in Moscow, has been published in Hume and Modern Philosophy: Legacy and Prospects (eds. Ilya Kasavin and Evgeny Blinov), Cambridge Scholars Press. He is supervising three PhD dissertations, one relating to Hume (Jen Kittlaus), two focused on aspects of Davidson’s philosophy (Justin Clarke, Martin Rule). And he is supervising an MA thesis on Davidson on communication.

University Distinguished Professor Ann Cudd left the College Dean’s office in August, only to join the Provost’s office as the new Vice Provost and Dean of Undergraduate Studies. In the past year she has made research presentations at the University of Northern Michigan, Georgetown, Vanderbilt, as the Pacific APA in San Francisco, Bad Homburg, Germany, and the University of Connecticut. She was the Program Chair for the AMINTAPHIL conference in Baltimore in 2012 and is editing a volume of essays, including essays by Rex Martin and Richard DeGeorge, from that conference. Her article “Wanting Freedom” was the lead article in the Winter issue of the Journal of Social Philosophy in 2012, and she has six additional articles published this year or forthcoming soon.

Derrick Darby was a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor during the winter term. That was not the best place to watch the Wolverines knock the Jayhawks out of the 2012 NCAA tournament, but it was a great place to do philosophy. During the year he completed work on two collaborative research projects including a paper forthcoming in Philosophical Topics with a KU social psychologist on egalitarianism and perceptions of inequality. He is currently working on a co-authored book on the achievement gap and social justice with a KU historian of education. Darby now holds a joint appointment with the School of Law, where he continues to teach a yearly seminar on topics in law and philosophy.

Cristian Dimitriu is a Part Time Lecturer in the Department. He is teaching the introductory course on Ethics for Honor students and a course on Marx and Marxism. He has taught courses in Political Philosophy, such as Problems in Global Justice, Cosmopolitanism and Justice and Economic Systems. He has also been developing his research agenda and presenting at various conferences.

Dale Dorsey spent most of last year on a research fellowship at Tulane University working on a book titled The Limits of Moral Authority. He presented work at Tulane, as well as The University of Leeds, The University of Colorado, Rice University, The University of Missouri, and Princeton University. In addition, he has been working on new topics in practical reason, and new work will soon be showing up in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, the Journal of Moral Philosophy, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Utilitas, and assorted other venues.

Ben Eggleston’s most recent journal article, in The Philosophical Quarterly, concerns the publicity condition: the idea that a moral theory is unacceptable if a world in which everyone subscribed to that theory would be problematic, in some way, from the point of view of the theory itself. Ben acknowledges that this idea is intuitively appealing but argues that it is ultimately untenable as a principle for judging moral theories. Ben was also awarded a Keeler Family Intra-University Professorship for the Fall 2013 semester, to support his research on the role of moral principles in judicial decision-making. For this project he is auditing parts of several classes at the KU law school. In teaching, Ben’s courses since the last newsletter have included introduction to ethics, a graduate seminar on cost-benefit analysis, and his course on the ethics of scientific research. He also taught a Mini-College class for the fourth consecutive year, but on a new topic: the ethics of genetic technology. As with past Mini-College classes, Ben was delighted with the active engagement of the participants and recommends Mini-College to alumni and friends of the department who might wish to return to campus for a week sometime.

Erin Frykholm has been teaching Modern Philosophy as well as the large Introduction to Philosophy course, appreciating the opportunities to entice new students to the field, and to work with graduate teaching assistants. As of this fall, she is the Director of Undergraduate Studies for the department, taking on as part of this task the goal of developing new recruitment materials for growing
our population of undergraduate majors. Last spring she took advantage of her research intensive semester to write two new papers on Hume, one on Humean virtues as associative, and one offering a Humean contribution to the discussion of particularism within virtue ethics. She also presented comments on Michael Slote’s recent book, *The Impossibility of Perfection*, at the 2013 meeting of the Society for Women in Philosophy at the western division of the American Philosophical Association in March. Her co-authored chapter on “Hedonism and Virtue” in *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century* (with Donald Rutherford) appeared in print this year, and her contribution on Hume to *The Routledge Handbook of Eighteen Century Philosophy* will appear in print either late this year or early next year. Her paper titled “The Ontology of Character Traits in Hume” has been provisionally accepted for publication at the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*.

**Scott Jenkins** is now an associate professor. He has recently published articles in *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Philosophy Compass, The Journal of the History of Philosophy*, and the Continuum Press volume *Aesthetics: The Key Thinkers*. Through the period of Fall 2012 through Spring 2013, he served as the department’s director of undergraduate studies, and taught the graduate tutorial course for incoming graduate students. That course focused on questions concerning life, death, and meaning -- especially the question of whether it would be better for us to be mortal or to be immortal.

This year Scott is on research leave thanks to a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities in support of his book project “Friedrich Nietzsche and the Problem of Pessimism.” The project considers the importance of a pessimistic, even tragic view of human existence for Nietzsche’s later theories of will to power and eternal recurrence. Thanks to the NEH fellowship, Scott has been able to do much of this work in the mountains of southern Montana.

**Don Marquis** is now on phased retirement and teaches only in the spring semester. In the spring semesters of 2012 and 2013 he taught history of ethics and a course in medical ethics that was limited to controversial life and death issues in medicine. He enjoys teaching, but every time he teaches a course he realizes that he could have taught it better. He looks forward to improvement next year.

In April 2012 Marquis was honored as the nominee from the philosophy department at the KU Teacher Appreciation Banquet. He supervised Megan Ritter’s undergraduate honors essay “Famine, Affluence and Our Duties to Others” that spring.

In November 2011 he gave the keynote address “Five Perspectives on Abortion Ethics” at the Undergraduate Philosophy Conference at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville. His short essay “A Defense of Morrisssey’s Strategy” appeared in *The American Journal of Bioethics* in June 2012. Marquis defended the moral permissibility of removing vital organs for transplantation from some donors who are not yet dead on the ground that ending the lives of such patients is not ruled out by the *reasons* that make killing wrong. Another short essay “Is There a Role for Potentiality in Bioethics?” appeared in *The American Journal of Bioethics* in January 2013.

Recently Marquis has been working on the analysis of arguments given in defense of what is now called the Donation after Circulatory Determination of Death protocol. He can show that all defenses of this protocol are unsound. His essay “Abortion and Death” appeared in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death* in 2013. His essay “The Doctrine of Double Effect,” appeared in the *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* this year. His essay “The Deliberately Induced Abortion of a Human Pregnancy is not Ethically Justifiable,” appeared in *Contemporary Debates in Bioethics* in September 2013.

Marquis read the paper, “Sumner on Euthanasia” at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division meeting in San Francisco in April 2013. This paper will, after some reworking, turn into an essay on why physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia should not be legalized. In September 2013 Marquis presented the short talk “What’s Wrong with ‘Cadaver’ Organ Donation and How to Fix It.” at the workshop *The Importance of Being Dead: The Dead Donor Rule and the Ethics of Transplantation Medicine at The Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany.*

Marquis also has recently given some local presentations. He presented “Ethical Issues in Medical Research,” at the KU Mini-College in June, 2012 and “Should We Ration Medical Care?” at the KU Mini-College in June, 2013. He also talked about the right of adults to refuse life-saving medical care at a meeting of the pre-med honorary Phil Delta Sigma, April 10, 2013.

Marquis’s infamous 1989 *Journal of Philosophy* paper “Why Abortion is Immoral” is still getting regularly reprinted and has now been reprinted 93 times. Unfortunately, Marquis now believes that there are some matters in the essay that are not quite correct and also some other matters of which he certainly could have given a clearer, and philosophically deeper, account.

Ethics Club, the medical ethics discussion group that Marquis has led since 1986, now meets monthly at Lawrence Memorial Hospital. Issues relating to American health care policy are very popular with this group these days, for obvious reasons.

Newcomer **Eileen Nutting** recently earned her PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles, with a dissertation entitled *Understanding Arithmetic through Definitions*. Throughout graduate school, she hobnobbed with KU alumni in the UCLA philosophy de-
partment: first Jesse Summers and Julie Wulfemeyer (both 2011 UCLA PhDs), and later Katie Elliott (UCLA assistant professor). This past winter, she ventured out of California to give presentations on mathematical knowledge ("On Interaction Problems and Hume’s Principle") and infinite regresses ("Stopping Regresses in Medieval Philosophy"). In the spring, she helped organize the third and final installment of the SoCal PhilMath + PhilLogic + FoM Workshops, which brought some top-notch mathematically-oriented philosophers to the Los Angeles area. Her next scheduled talk is close to home, at K-State. This year she is teaching an honors introduction to philosophy, epistemology, ancient philosophy, and the philosophy of mathematics. Nutting is delighted for the excuse to discuss both contemporary and historical ideas with KU students.

Sarah Robins is starting as an Assistant Professor this fall, after spending a year at the University of Texas at El Paso. She received her Ph.D. from Washington University in St. Louis (as a proud member of the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program directed by KU alumnus Ron Mal- lon). She presented a paper at the Mentoring Project workshop at UMass, Amherst over the summer and will present another paper at Wake Forest University later this fall. Sarah recently published a paper ‘Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge’, but continues to spend most of her time thinking about memory. In this vein, she is working on papers defending the causal theory of memory and explaining memory errors, while continuing to develop a theory of remembering as a book-length manuscript. Sarah is teaching Introduction to Philosophy, Honors and Philosophy of Mind this fall, and looking forward to teaching a graduate seminar on memory in the spring, along with Modern Philosophy.

Although mainly working on ancient theories of causation, Tom Tuozzo occasionally yields to the siren call of love and pleasure (or rather, Plato’s theories of them). He gave a paper on the Symposium Platonicum in Pisa in July 2013, and a paper on the Philebus at the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy in Athens the next month. Between those two engagements he had time to visit the Vatican Museum, where he took in Raphael’s School of Athens in the flesh for the first time. One of the side pieces represents “The Knowledge of Causes” (Causarum Cognitio)–which Tom considers a good omen. He also gave a presentation on the unrelated topic of philosophy in Plato’s letters at University College London in September.

James Woelfel’s article, “Challengers of Scientism Past and Present: William James and Marilynne Robinson” was published in the May 2013 issue of “American Journal of Theology & Philosophy.” He is also working on a contribution to a forthcoming volume on the history of KU from 1965 to 2015, to be published in 2015 by University Press of Kansas. The chapter will tell the story of how the idea of a liberal education and its curricular implementation has changed at KU over the past 50 years.

As part of the bicentennial celebration of Kierkegaard’s birth, Woelfel presented “’The Outward Is Not the Inward’: A Central Theme in Kierkegaard’s Author- ship” at the Hong Kierkegaard Library, St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota. He also presented “A Subversive Memoir of the Great War: Jane Addams’ Peace and Bread in Time of War” at the 19th annual conference of AJTP in Ottawa, Canada.

LINDLEY LECTURES

We are excited to announce that the Lindley Lectures are now available in electronic form at http://kuscho-larworks.ku.edu/dspace/handle/1808/11682. This collection includes all the lectures that the department holds the copyright and several lectures that have been out of print for years. Future lectures will be uploaded as they become available.
After a lengthy illness, Professor Richard Cole died at home on April 3, 2013. He had retired from the University of Kansas, after a 36-year career as a member of the Department of Philosophy, in 2001.

Professor Cole received his BA in Mathematics from the University of Texas in 1956 and in 1962 completed his PhD in Philosophy at the University of Chicago with a dissertation entitled *Possibilities*. An Assistant Professor of Philosophy for three years at Grinnell College, he joined the KU Department of Philosophy in 1965. He was Exxon Intra-University Professor of the History of Science at KU, 1980-81 and Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa, 1983.

With particular teaching and research interests in Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of Mathematics, Logic, Metaphysics, and the History of Philosophy he supervised twelve PhD dissertations and ten MA theses to completion, served as a member of an additional twenty-seven dissertation committees, supervised numerous undergraduate honors essays, served as mentor to several University Scholars. His graduate and undergraduate teaching displayed not only his extraordinary philosophical (and scientific) breadth and curiosity, but also the great pleasure he took in co-teaching with colleagues both in Philosophy and in other disciplines. He was the most engaged and sympathetic of colleagues in countless departmental colloquia.

Professor Cole’s many publications in his areas of special interest appeared in such journals as *Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, International Philosophical Quarterly, The Journal of Value Inquiry, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Review of Metaphysics, Nous, Theoria,* and *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy.* ‘Hard and Soft Intensionalism’, co-authored with Howard Kahane, and published in *Review of Metaphysics,* was the product of lively and constructive discussion between two KU colleagues with very different philosophical views. It is most unfortunate that long illness prevented his completion of his envisaged book on *The Philosophy of Nature.*

Professor Cole made extensive and varied service contributions to the Department, the College, the University, and the Profession. He served the Department as Acting Chair and as Director of Graduate studies on several occasions and was an energetic, reflective member of countless Departmental, College and University committees over the years. His College and University service focused in particular on curricular matters, on the place of the history and philosophy of science, on freedom of expression, and on faculty rights and privileges. Active in many philosophical and philosophical societies over the many years, he was president of the Southwestern Philosophical Society, 1997-78, and president of the KU chapter of AAUP, 1982-83.

Those who have served with him in the Department of Philosophy at KU remember Richard Cole as the most generous, supportive, energetic, and stimulating of colleagues, and we mourn his loss.
**Alumni News**

**Sheila C. Bair** (Philosophy, BA, 1975, Law Degree 1978) received the Doctor of Laws during the 2012 KU Commencement ceremony. She served as the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from 2006-2011 and now is a senior adviser for the Pew Charitable Trusts. Her book, *Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself,* was published Fall 2012 by Free Press.

**Megan Ritter** (Philosophy, BA, 2012) received one of the Agnes Wright Strickland Awards during 2012 Commencement. She received the award in recognition of her academic record, leadership in matters of university concern, and respect among fellow students.

**Jack Horner** (MA, 1976) has published 21 papers on topics including quantum logic, turtle phylogeny, the potential spread of various tropical diseases under climate change, implementing Boolean logic in DNA, and the effect of primordial binaries on the evolution of small globular clusters. He has recently implemented prototype automated deduction systems for the first 11 propositions of Part I of Spinoza’s *Ethics* and for L. J. Savage’s personalist theory of probability. He continued to serve on the advisory board of the Kansas University Biodiversity Institute and on the editorial boards of two bioinformatics journals, is an occasional referee for a supercomputing journal, and writes a monthly practical science column for a newspaper.

**Eric Berg**’s (PhD, 2005) essay entitled “Lessons in Contrast from The Fall: From Lucidity to Opacity” was accepted into the 2013 Camus Society UK/USA joint meeting/conference which took place on Friday November 16, 2013 in London, England. Eric was also appointed Chair of the General Education Committee at MacMurray College. He will oversee curriculum development, assessment, and plan the future of General Education here at MacMurray.

Oxford University has invited **Dr. Kara Tan Bhala**, (PhD, 2009) President and Founder of Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics, and lecturer at the University of Kansas School of Business to deliver a presentation on the topic of Ethics in Finance. Oxford University’s Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics hosted Dr. Tan Bhala. Her talk, scheduled for May 2013, was part of the Centre’s St. Cross Series on Special Ethics. This invitation was the first, at least in recent memory, extended by Oxford University to a faculty member at the KU School of Business to deliver a major solo address.

**Stephen C. Ferguson II** (PhD, 2004) received tenure at North Carolina A & T in 2012. He was the section editor of Africana Philosophy section in The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2011). In 2012 he co-authored with John McClendon, Beyond The White Shadow: Philosophy, Sports and the African American Experience. In addition, he has published the several articles. Here is a sample:

- “The Philosopher King: Dialectics in the Political Thought and Practice of Martin Luther King, Jr.,” in *Philosophical Perspectives on Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. Robert E. Birt (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012), 87-107
- “Marxism, Philosophy and the Africana World: A Philosophical Commentary,” *Black Scholar* Special Issue on Black Philosophy Edited by George Yancy (Forthcoming Spring 2014)
Charles Reagan (PhD, 1967) Senior Advisor to the President, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Aviation, Kansas State University, contacted the department in Fall 2011 with the following memories and updates on activities:

“When I read in the K.U. Philosophy Department newsletter that Richard DeGeorge was retiring after 50 years, I thought back 45 years ago when he was my major advisor and I received the first Ph.D. in philosophy in 1967 at KU. I wrote on a then-unknown French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur. My encounter with him when I was a student at the Sorbonne led to my becoming his friend, confidante, and biographer. I became an assistant professor of philosophy at Kansas State University right after getting my Ph.D. and taught there for 19 years, with one year sabbatical in Paris and one year as a Fulbright Visiting Professor at the University of Toulouse. In 1986, I went to the President’s Office at Kansas State as the Deputy to the President, a position I held for 24 years. I am now back in the classroom, teaching philosophy. During my 45 years at Kansas State, I also served as Chairman of the Landon Lectures for 26 years, bringing 92 prominent political and public figures to Manhattan to give lectures. My book, *Political Power and Public Influence*, has just been published. It recounts the behind the scenes and personal interactions with these 92 people.

I also had a parallel career in aviation. It began as a private pilot and then commercial pilot. That let to my moonlighting (literally) as a commuter airline pilot, charter pilot, flight instructor, and contract pilot. I got an Airline Transport Pilot rating and two jet ratings and for 11 years flew Kansas State University’s jet. In 2008, I received the Governor’s Aviation Honors Award for my over $11 million in federal grants and private funds to purchase airplanes, including the jet, for the K-State Aviation program. I have been elected to a second term on the Board of Directors of the National Business Aviation Association, a Washington trade and advocacy association, and to the Governing Board of the International Business Aviation Council. This group represents the interests of business aviation before governments and with the International Civil Aviation Organization, a U.N. body charged with making international aviation rules and regulations.

I have published seven books, including a biography of Paul Ricoeur, an anthology of his work, a collective work on his philosophy. Also, an introduction to philosophy and one of the first books in applied ethics, *Ethics for Scientific Researchers.*”

Charles Reagan received the first PhD from the Philosophy Department in 1967.

Jim Austin sent the following recollection and update of activities:

“I was delighted to see the reference to Auslegung in the latest KU Philosophy newsletter.

I was a doctoral student doing Wittgenstein under Brownstein, though I think Tony Genova was my key faculty member. He was also my mentor. It was Tony who let me out of my KU scholarship commitment to go to Oxford when they recruited me (actually it was Exeter first, Oxford a year later). I got my DPhil from Oxford in 1980.

I left academia when I got back in the USA and headed up a nonprofit company that produced major arts festivals. I just retired to the farm. Tony and I shared some interesting words on the subject of leaving academia a year or so before he died. It probably would not be appropriate for the journal, but it sure shows Tony’s wisdom and personality.”

Congratulations to Russell Waltz on his appointment as Assistant Professor at Miami Dade College.
**Returning Students**

Thanks to John Bricke and the Morrison Fund for Philosophy and Math, three students who received the BA in Philosophy from KU returned to give public lectures last year.

Ron Mallon, the Director of the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program and Associate Professor Philosophy, Washington University (St. Louis) presented “Referential Ambiguity” in October. Ron received his BA in 1993, and his PhD from Rutgers. He has been a Laurence S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellowship at the Center for Human Values, Princeton University and received fellowships and awards from American Council of Learned Societies and University of Utah. Ron and Shaun Nichols were co-authors of “Rules” which was included in The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology (2010). He is currently working on a book project on “Making Up Your Mind: The Social Construction and Human Kinds.” His areas of specialization are Mind, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Science and Social Science, Social and Political Theory, Metaphysics and Ethics.

Deborah Heikes, Professor of Philosophy, University of Alabama-Huntsville also presented a lecture in April which was titled “Philosophy’s Outward Turn.” After receiving her BA from KU in 1991, Deborah received her MA from Baylor and her PhD from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1998. Her areas of specialization are Feminist Epistemology, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Philosophy of Mind. She has two books, The Virtue of Feminist Rationality (Continuum Press 2012) and Rationality and Feminist Philosophy (Continuum Press 2010) and many other articles and presentations.

Michael O’Rourke, Professor of Philosophy, Michigan State University presented “On Epistemic Integration” in April. Mike received his BA in 1987 and his PhD from Stanford University in 1995. His areas of specialization are Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Critical Thinking and Metaphilosophy. With C. Washington, Mike edited Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry (The MIT Press, 2007). He has numerous edited books based on presentations at the annual Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference of which he was co-director from 1998-2009.

**Auslegung**

As of last spring, Auslegung: The Journal of Philosophy transitioned from print to a gratis, open access model. Auslegung (volumes 1 through 30) can be found at http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/handle/1808/8834. Thanks to Russell Waltz, editor at the time, and the Center for Digital Scholarship, KU Libraries for developing the site.

Sean Meseroll, the current editor, looks forward to continuing the progress that Russell made. They hope to further increase the journal’s reputation by 1) releasing a special issue on the ethics of publishing this fall and 2) publishing three to four issues of the journal a year, rather than just two.